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Book Review

PREEMPTION CHOICE IN CONTEXT
PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND
REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION.
William W. Buzbee, ed.1 New York, Cambridge University
Press. 2009. Pp. xv+ 319. $90.00 (Cloth).

Michael S. Greve2
INTRODUCTION
Preemption law, not so long ago a province of legal
technicians and policy specialists, has become the subject of an
increasingly voluble and contentious debate. Intense political
and interest group fights over the preemptive scope of federal
law, in areas from global warming to financial regulation to
consumer products, have been covered in the popular press.
Preemption cases form a core part of the Roberts Court's docket
of "business cases," itself a matter of considerable controversy
and commentary.3 Scholarly books and articles on preemption
have proliferated in recent years.4
1. Professor and Director of the Environmental and Natural Resources Law
Program, Emory University School of Law.
2. Ph.D. (Cornell University, 1987); John G. Searle Scholar, American Enterprise
Institute.
3. For press coverage of preemption, see, e.g., Alicia Mundy & Brent Kendall,
Shift Toward State Rules on Product Liability, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2009, at A3. For the
Roberts Court's "business docket" see, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court, Inc., N. Y.
TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38. Law review articles include: Robin Conrad, The
Roberts Court and the Myth of a Pro-Business Bias, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 997 (2009)
and Jonathan Adler, Business, the Environment, and the Roberts Court: A Preliminary
Assessment, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 943 (2009). See also Doug Kendall, Big Business's
Big Term, SLATE (Mar. 5, 2008), http://www.slate.com/id/2185844/; David C. Vladek,
Safety Last, THE NATION (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.thenation.com/article/safety-last;
David G. Savage, High Court Is Good For Business, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 2007, at Al;
Alicia Mundy & Shirley S. Wang, In Drug Case, Justices to Weigh Right to Sue, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 27, 2008, at Bl; Editorial, Injustice 5, Justice 4, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at Al8.
4. See, e.g., THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL
BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES (2008); Symposium, Ordering State-Federal
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Preemption Choice, a collection of essays expertly organized
and edited by William W. Buzbee, promises to add to the debate
and the burgeoning literature by contributing "to the
development of normative arguments against preemption" (p.
3). "Development" is a bit of an exaggeration. Most of the
authors have elaborated their positions against preemption
elsewhere, often, and in much greater detail; the book's virtue
lies in compiling concise, accessible summaries of their views.
"Normative"
and
"against,"
in
contrast,
are
apt
characterizations. Preemption Choice contains summaries of the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence (Christopher H. Schroeder) and
of preemption doctrine and its interplay with federalism theory
(Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson); these economical
and characteristically competent essays go easy on polemics and
normative prescriptions. It also contains an essay by Bradford R.
Clark, arguing that the Supremacy Clause, correctly understood,
not only grounds but also limits the federal government's
preemptive authority. With these exceptions, though, the volume
is given over to advocates of "polyphonic," "dynamic,"
"interactive," "adaptive," or "empowerment" federalism. The
varying adjectives"'--- for purposes at hand, I will stick with
"polyphonic" - aim to capture supposedly salutary features of a
federalism conception that embodies a deep skepticism about
the federal preemption of state law. Congress, the contributors
agree, should use its powers to set a regulatory "floor"
underneath the states. In the absence of federal minimum
requirements (for example, for product safety or environmental
quality), states are likely to "race to the bottom."5 Above the
floor, however, states should be left free to adopt more stringent,
protective regulations. Concurrent state and federal regulationand, for producers in interstate commerce, a polyphony of at
least fifty-one regulators for any given product or transaction6 -

Relations through Federal Preemption Doctrine, 102

Symposium,

Nw. U. L.

REV. 503 (2007);

Federal Preemption of State Tort Law: The Problem of Medical Drugs and

PEPP. L. REV. 1 (2005); FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS,
NATIONAL INTERESTS (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007).
5. Buzbee, pp. 8-9, 98-104, calls federal minimum standards "floor preemption."
The usage is a bit idiosyncratic. True preemption, called "ceiling preemption" by Buzbee,
deprives state law above the ceiling of any force and effect. In contrast, "floor
preemption" has no legal displacement effect. For example, a $9 federal minimum wage
leaves state minima above and below that floor in force: if a state has a minimum wage of
$8, an employer who pays $7 can still be prosecuted for violating both federal and state
law. As a practical matter, of course, it is true that "floor preemption" wipes out the
lower-minimum states' policy choice.
6. "At least," because several contributors place special emphasis on the salutary
Devices, 33
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ought to be the general rule. In essay after essay, the authors
expound on the virtues of federalism, so conceived: it will
facilitate state experimentation, compensate for federal
agencies' failures, create information-producing feedback loops
among regulators, and allow for the dynamic adaptation of
regulatory regimes in response to changed circumstances or new
information.
The notion that polyphonic, concurrent regulation might
also have significant drawbacks-that state officials, and jurors,
as well as federal regulators, may have warped incentives, that
concurrent powers might produce cacophony rather than
polyphony, that public purposes might get lost in an
intergovernmental shuffle, or that compounding legal
obligations might result in excessive regulation-does not
unduly trouble the contributors. Occasional acknowledgments of
"common pro-preemption arguments" (p. 3) based on
considerations of uniformity, finality, democratic accountability,
or economies of scale are quickly waved aside. The most explicit
recognition of polyphony's potential "pitfalls" (Robert A.
Shapiro's, pp. 44-46) terminates in the confident conclusion that
"[t]he management of dynamic overlap is a task best performed
by branches of government other than the courts." (p. 46).
Agreement on the normative priors allows the editor and
contributors to trace the implications of their view through a
wide range of subtle yet salient questions-for example, the
preemption of state tort law (David C. Vladeck), the role of
statutory "savings clauses" in favor of state law (Sandi Zellmer),
federal preemption by inaction rather than affirmative
prohibition (Robert L. Glicksman), and preemption by agency
choice rather than explicit legislative mandate (William Funk).
However and alas, the inordinate emphasis on ideological and
thematic coherence limits both the informational value of
Preemption Choice and the plausibility of its federalism vision.
POLYPHONY IN CONTEXT
For readers who are unfamiliar with the preemption debate
of the past half-decade, Preemption Choice may seem
disorienting. One question arises from the avowedly liberal
progressive thrust of the federalism project embraced in this
role of non-preempted state courts and juries. In that world, the upper bound of
regulators is defined not by the number of states but by plaintiffs' lawyers' forum choices.
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volume. If memory serves, federalism used to be the
conservative Rehnquist Court's agenda, about which
progressives had little positive to say. Have they changed their
minds, or do they mean something very different by
"federalism"? A second question is how and why the once
obscure preemption question (a statutory question, is it not?) has
mutated into "Federalism's Core Question" (a constitutional
issue-no?).7 Preemption Choice does not directly engage these
questions. The closest it comes to addressing them is Robert A.
Shapiro's essay on the law's path "From Dualism to Polyphony."
Shapiro rightly suggests that the federalism embraced in
Preemption Choice has a pedigree in the Progressive Era and the
New Deal-which, notwithstanding its nationalist impulses,
always embodied a potent pro-state streak, famously captured in
Justice Brandeis' celebration of states as "laboratories of
democracy."8 Progressive-polyphonic federalism's foe and foil is
the "dual" federalism of the nineteenth century, which operated
against a baseline of separate and exclusive spheres of federal
and state jurisdiction. Dual federalism was dislodged by the New
Deal. Contrary to a widespread misunderstanding, however, the
New Deal did not simply trump federalism and the states with
"nationalist" policies, institutions, and legal doctrines. Rather,
Shapiro notes (citing Stephen Gardbaum's important writings on
the subject), the New Deal unleashed both the national
government and the states from the strictures of the "old"
Constitution (pp. 37-41).9 An integral part of that
transformation was a state-protective shift in preemption
doctrine. The pre-New Deal Court usually operated with a
doctrine of "latent exclusivity": once Congress had entered a
regulatory arena, state regulation in the field was deemed
preempted regardless of any direct conflict with federal law, and
regardless of whether or not Congress had intended that result.10
In the post-New Deal era, in contrast, preemption law turns on
7. The extent to which constitutional presumptions should drive statutory
preemption analysis has been a matter of some controversy among the Justices. See, e.g.,
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861 (2000).
8. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
9. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the
States, 64 CHI. L. REV. 483 (1997) [hereinafter, Gardbaum, New Deal].
10. Stephen Gardbaum, The Breadth vs. the Depth of Congress's Commerce Power:
The Curious History of Preemption during the Lochner Era, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION:
STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 48 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve
eds., 2007) [hereinafter Gardbaum, Breadth vs. Depth].
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the intent of Congress. Barring an outright conflict between
federal and state law, state law continues to operate, concurrent
with federal law, unless Congress preempts the states either
expressly or by "clear and manifest" implication.11
At one level, progressive federalism has changed little over
the past century. "Dynamism," "adaptation," and "polyphony"
are simply new monikers for the perceived advantages of the
"cooperative" federalism championed by Felix Frankfurter and
Louis Brandeis. However, the context of those arguments has
changed in two highly salient ways. First, the federalism debate
of the Progressive era covered a much wider range of legal
questions. Federal preemption was a federalism question back
then12 - but not "Federalism's Core Question" by any stretch. In
part, this has to do with the lower density of federal legislation at
the time. In much larger part, it has to do with the fact that the
pre-New Deal Court viewed the protection of the commerce of
the United States against state exploitation as its foremost
constitutional obligation. To that end, the Court administered a
raft of constitutional and jurisdictional doctrines. Among them
was the dormant Commerce Clause, which loomed much larger
then than it does now, both in terms of its doctrinal breadth and
by the sheer number of Supreme Court decisions.13 There was
the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction and the federal general
common law of Swift v. Tyson,14 which gave parties in interstate
commerce an escape from what we now call state "hellhole
jurisdictions." There was the substantive due process doctrine of
Lochner notoriety, which restricted state legislation and
regulation in many of the domains where polyphonists would
dearly love to see it exercised. (Justice Brandeis' paean to state
experimentation, of course, originated in this context. )15 To these
familiar doctrines, one could add others-for example, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, restrictive doctrines of personal
jurisdiction, or the then-potent "extraterritoriality" prong of the
Due Process Clause, all of which curbed the reach of state law
over interstate commerce.
Virtually all of these doctrines disappeared in the wake of
the New Deal.16 The brief historical detour, then, answers the
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
For a concise summary, see Gardbaum, Breadth vs. Depth, supra note 10.
Shapiro notes its reduced scope after New Deal: p. 40.
41 u. s. 1 (1842).
New State Ice Co., v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
For a survey of the doctrines and their demise, see Gardbaum, New Deal, supra
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initial question of why preemption has become federalism's
"core" question: with the arguable exception of a softened and
embattled dormant Commerce Clause,17 it is the only still-extant
state-restrictive doctrine of any practical consequence. This
point has doctrinal and practical significance. If the once-narrow
preemption debate now teems with constitutional presumptions
and macro-theoretical federalism arguments, that is because the
humble doctrine has come to do all the work of the long
discarded constitutional doctrines. And if preemption has
become ground zero in a grim trench war between producer
interests and their adversaries, that is because both sides
recognize preemption as the last legal obstacle to an
environment in which state regulators operate without any
meaningful legal restraint.
Polyphonists have emphatically made their preemption
choice. That is fine and good, and, as noted, seeing the troops in
close array has its advantages. Candor on the point, however,
would have been more becoming than the false air of
deliberation that hovers over this volume, beginning with its
title.18 Better yet would be a recognition and acknowledgment
that the fight over contemporary preemption law, viewed against
a broader federalism background and trajectory, is over the last
inches of territory.
A CHEER FOR THE NEW DEAL CONSTITUTION
Polyphonists, as just seen, are heirs to the New Deal
tradition; but they would also radicalize that tradition. The New
Deal's commitment to enhancing state authority over interstate

note 9.
17. "Embattled," in that conservative Justices (as well as some scholars) have
repeatedly criticized the doctrine as an illegitimate judicial invention and called for its
sharp curtailment or even its demise. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. Dep't of
Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 254 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 595 (1997) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); see also United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (Roberts, C. J.). Shapiro, p. 47, criticizes the
Roberts Court's "aggressive use of the dormant Commerce Clause." That
characterization, highly doubtful even when written, has become untenable in light of
subsequent decisions. See Norman R. Williams & Brandon P. Denning, The "New
Protectionism" and the American Common Market, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247 (2009).
18.
Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) ("I will not amuse you with
an appearance of deliberation when I have decided."). Buzbee, p. 3, endeavors to convey
an impression of over-all "balance" and promises that "[s]everal chapters explore and
enrich . . . common pro-preemption arguments." I have been unable to find those
chapters.
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commerce and corporations was still checked by countervailing,
"nationalist" impulses. The dominant form of New Deal
regulation was the management of industry sectors by expert
administrative agencies. That model requires protection against
collateral attack and state interference-including preemgtion
protective judicial doctrines, some of them quite robust. The
over-all ambivalence between state empowerment and
nationalism is embodied in the still-canonical preemption
formula of Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.20 Rice captures the
nationalist side in a judicial willingness to imply federal
preemption where Congress has failed to express it. The state
friendly, polyphonic side is captured in an (erratically enforced)
1
"presumption against preemption. "2
The New Deal regulatory model fell out of favor a half
century ago. Critics Left and Right concluded that supposed
expert agencies were often "captured" by regulated industries
and that "regulation" often amounted to little more than the
national organization of labor, industrial, and agricultural
cartels. This critique looms large in the preemption and
federalism theory of Preemption Choice. Concurrent state
regulation, the theory holds, will compensate for the manifest
failures of federal regulatory agencies-their capture,
ossification, lack of resources, and information deficits. It is
difficult to quarrel with the implicit critique of New Deal
regulation. It is equally difficult to defend the preemption
formula of the New Deal Constitution, the source of a
universally lamented "muddle" in preemption law.22 It is still
harder, however, to endorse the proposed, polyphonic remedy.
For all its flaws, the New Deal model, or rather its
nationalist streak, sought to protect legitimate interests in
administrative expertise and coherent public administration.
19. The National Labor Relations Board's near-exclusive authority, for example,
was and is to this day protected by decidedly monophonic preemption doctrines. See
Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132
(1976); S.D. Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957). If polyphonists were to
consider these doctrines (which they do not), they might come to question the facile
assumption that firm (ceiling) preemption automatically embodies pro-corporate, anti
consumer preferences.
20. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
21. For more on this tension, see Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve,
Conclusion, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 309,
317-18 (2007).
22. Nary an article on the subject fails to note the consensus that preemption law is
a "muddle." See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 233 (2000) (noting
the point and providing references).
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And for all the inanity of its economic theories,23 the New Deal
model still reflected production values: it sought to stabilize
economic markets, not to destroy them. The federalism theory
on display in Preemption Choice does not so much disavow those
orientations; it fails to even contemplate them. David C.
Vladeck, for example, inveighs against preempting state tort
lawsuits over "mislabeled" or unduly dangerous pharmaceutical
products. The obvious objection that lay juries lack expertise is
met with the reply that tort suits will bring new information to
light (pp. 69-71). That may be so-but at what price to product
availability and incentives for innovation? Similarly, Trevor
Morrison would expose financial and other industries to
increased oversight, investigation, and expansive conduct
remedies by state attorneys general. He is unperturbed that
attorneys general-unlike (say) the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the Comptroller of the Currency-have little
working knowledge of the industries and no official
responsibility for their effective operation.
That blithe indifference to production values is common to
all the normatively oriented essays in Preemption Choice.
Polyphonists look to consumer interests in more protection and
compensation, to the virtual exclusion of producer-firms' and
their employees'. Nor do they believe in expertise or in coherent
public policy. Their case rests on an exceedingly confident
assumption to the effect that more regulation is ipso facto better
regulation.
LIMITS? TRADE-OFFS?
None of the authors states the absurd more-is-better
premise in haec verba. However, it is difficult to make sense of
polyphony on any other assumption. Apart from perfunctory
acknowledgments of pro-preemption concerns, the polyphony
on display in Preemption Choice recognizes neither limits nor
trade-offs. One scours the volume in vain for a single real-world
example of a federal preemptive statute, or a Supreme Court
finding of preemption, that would find favor with the author.
Three examples further illustrate the point.

23.

Richard A. Posner, Brandeis and Holmes, Business and Economics, Then
1 REV. L. & ECON. 1, 5 (2005) (noting that Justice Brandeis supported many
New Deal programs, such as maximum hour and minimum wage laws, the goal of the
latter being "(to put it bluntly) . . . to force up wages by monopolizing the labor supply").
See

and Now,
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Subject-Matter. The contributions to Preemption Choice
are devoted almost exclusively to two regulatory areas: health
and safety regulation, especially the federal Food and Drug
Administration's (FDA) approval of prescription drugs and
medical devices; and environmental regulation, especially the
regulation of global warming and greenhouse gases. These are
important areas, and they have occupied a great deal of judicial
attention. They are also prime fields of federal preemption over
state tort law (as distinct from legislative or administrative
measures), a question that has proven particularly contentious.24
Even so, a broader inquiry would have illuminated both the
trade-offs involved in preemption choice, and, moreover,
polyphonic federalism's intended scope and content.
Consider, even if Preemption Choice does not, the
regulation of common carriers such as airlines, truckers, and
railroads: federal preemptive statutes categorically prohibit
states from any regulation "relating to" the rates, routes, or
services of such enterprises.25 These provisions are the
centerpieces of common carrier regulation (one cannot
deregulate airlines without affirmatively prohibiting the states
from re-regulating them), and the Supreme Court has
consistently defended them against state evasion.26 Is that
preemption choice right, or wrong? One can imagine a
polyphonic answer either way.
Environmental, health, and safety regulation involves highly
complex, technically challenging decisions about managing risk
under conditions of great uncertainty. That context may be
thought to produce a prima facie case for adaptation, dynamism,
feedback, and other polyphonic virtues. But that is not so, a
sensible polyphonist might concede, with conventional price and
entry regulations. The subject-matter is low-tech; the economic
theory is well understood; and experiments are pointless when
we know them to be inefficient, as with price and entry
regulation.
The argument sounds plausible, and it would give content
and contours to polyphony. But I made it up, and on the
evidence of Preemption Choice, it is impossible to know whether
24.

For empirical evidence, see Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in
14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 52 (2006)
(showing that tort preemption cases are more contested).
25. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(b)(l) (2006). For airlines, see 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(l) (2006).
26. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992); Rowe v. N.H.
Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008).

the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Assessment,
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any polyphonist would credit it.27 Does the regulatory context
matter? Or is it that health and safety regulation, unlike price
and entry regulation, often implicates claims for individual
compensation, which warrant special consideration? Or should
polyphony reign across the board, such that the federal
deregulation statutes were misguided and the Supreme Court
decision interpreting them erroneous? In failing to address
questions of this sort, Preemption Choice fails to give the reader
a sense of polyphony's intended limits, if any.
Risk and Expertise. Even within the area of health, safety,
and environmental regulation, polyphony's intended scope
remains murky.28 The central legal issue in this arena is the
question of whether federal standards should be understood-in
the absence of an express preemption provision-as a federal
minimum or "floor" that lets states experiment with more
restrictive requirements, as polyphony would have it; or whether
such standards should be understood as establishing a
preemptive "ceiling" as well as a floor. The Supreme Court has
wavered between these two approaches. Ceiling-and-floor
decisions (most prominently, Justice Breyer's majority opinion
in Geier v. Honda Motor Co.)29 often interpret federal standards
as embodying a deliberate effort to establish a regulatory
"optimum." Several contributors harshly criticize this position. It
presupposes, Thomas 0. McGarity writes, "that the [federal]
agencies are doing such an effective job of protecting the public
ex ante that the added incentives provided by the common law
are unnecessary and the amount of residual damage caused by
27. The firm preemption provisions at issue serve none of the pro-preemption
values acknowledged, however cavalierly, in Preemption Choice (uniformity, finality,
accountability, economies of scale). Their principal purpose and effect is to wipe out the
states' (as well as the carriers') regulatory rents-in contrast to other, more "polyphonic"
regimes (for example, telecommunications) that proteCt those rents to the detriment of
consumers. See, e.g., Robert Crandall, Local and Long Distance Competition: Replacing
Regulation with Competition, in COMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION AND FCC REFORM
53 (Randolph J. May & Jeffrey A. Eisenach eds., 2001); Thomas W. Hazlett, ls Federal
Preemption Efficient in Cellular Phone Regulation? 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 155 (2003).
Whether the contributors to Preemption Choice are pro- or anti-rent, I cannot say.
28. E.g., p. 295: "Clearly, where a proliferating polyglot of state-level regulations
becomes enormously disruptive to the economy, federal preemption may be warranted."
(emphasis added). A sentence that starts on "clearly" and ends in evasion might have
been given some content by means of reference to, or discussion of, an actual case. See,
e.g,. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001) ("As a practical
matter, complying with the FDA's detailed regulatory regime in the shadow of 50 States'
tort regimes will dramatically increase the burdens facing potential applicants-burdens
not contemplated by Congress in enacting the FDCA and the MDA."). Is that
consideration sufficiently "enormously disruptive"?
29. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861, 864 (2000).
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the regulated products or activities is acceptably low." (p. 255).
This confident avennent, however, grossly misstates the
"optimum" position both with respect to the compensatory and
the deterrence function of state common law.30
As for "damage," everyone agrees that federal statutes
establish incomplete regulatory regimes that deal with
prevention, to the exclusion of compensatory mechanisms.
Almost everyone agrees that the erratic, high-transaction-cost
tort system is a lousy way of providing compensation. (The best
reply is that the tort system will have to do so long as no other
compensation device is reliably available.) The question, then, is
how to combine two imperfect systems without unduly
compromising the function of either. A large, subtle,
sophisticated literature deals with that difficult trade-off and
exercise in institutional coordination.31 Not one of the major
contributions merits a citation, let alone discussion, in
Preemption Choice.
As for the "effectiveness" of federal law, the case for
understanding federal agency standards as a preemptive
optimum rather than a mere floor does not rest on any cheerful
assumption about the competence of federal agencies but on a
rough institutional calculus. Health and safety regulation
typically presents risks on either side. Every life-saving drug will
have dangers, and every label will create dangers of over- as well
as under-warning. While there are reasons to think that federal
health and safety agencies will at times under-protect public
health, there are equally potent reasons to think that they will
often suffer from an excess of caution.32 Polyphony offers no
remedy for that systemic failure; it only cuts one way. A good
30. The Supreme Court's preemption cases have vacillated in their emphasis on the
compensation and deterrence functions of tort law. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products
Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 450, 459 (2008)
[hereinafter Sharkey, Products Liability].
31. For examples in one single regulatory arena (the approval and labeling of
pharmaceutical drugs and devices) see, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by
Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227,
237-43 (2007); Sharkey, Products Liability, supra note 30, at 459; Richard Nagareda,
FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L. 4 (2006);
Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug Cases, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 463 (2009). For a post-Preemption Choice discussion see Catherine M.
Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law Products Liability
Claims, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 437, 445 (2009). All articles contain further extensive
citations and references.
32.
See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 677, 707 (1975); Cass Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 407, 418 (1990).
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case can be made for institutional redundancy as an error
correcting or feedback mechanism. Barring an unsustainable
"more is always better" presumption, however, there is every
reason to distrust a one-directional mechanism. That caution
applies with special force to "error correction" by inexpert juries
with massive hindsight bias.33
Incentives. The contributors to Preemption Choice are
effusive on the good things that concurrent state regulation
"can" or "will" contribute to a world governed by poorly
incentivized federal regulators. They are close to mum on the
incentives that might induce state regulators to do just the
opposite.
In an intriguing contribution, Trevor W. Morrison argues
that courts should direct their preemption inquiry, not so much
to subject-matter but rather to "the identity of the actor
enforcing the state law" (p. 81). State attorneys general, he
argues, ought to receive special deference in preemption cases,
both on the part of federal regulators and by courts. With few
exceptions, state attorneys general-unlike regulators- are
directly elected by their respective state electorates. Deference
would therefore promote federalism values of accountability and
democratic self-governance.34 Moreover, it would "recognize[]
the enormous potential value of state attorneys general to the
enforcement of both state and federal law" (p. 94). Morrison
discusses only a single objection to his proposal- to wit, the
apprehension that state attorney general proceedings against
predominantly
out-of-state
corporations
might
have
troublesome extraterritorial consequences and inflict economic
costs on shareholders or workers in other states. Having stated
the concern, Morrison dismisses it out of hand. Federal
33. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008) ("A jury . . . sees only the
cost of a more dangerous design, and is not concerned with its benefits; the patients who
reaped those benefits are not represented in court.").
34. Morrison acknowledges the (fairly minor) problem that not all attorneys
general are elected. He ignores the far larger problem that attorneys general are not the
only elected officials in any given state-and that the prospect of substantial settlement
awards may derange democratic separation of powers arrangements at the state level.
Many attorneys general are entrusted with fearsome prosecutorial powers. Among the
reasons for tolerating those powers is, or was, a system of legislative budget controls-a
crude yet vital safeguard against excessive enforcement, especially where enforcement
authority is poorly defined. That safeguard is eviscerated when large financial recoveries
tum attorneys general into profit centers for cash-strapped legislatures: in-between
elections, state attorneys general are effectively liberated to act as entrepreneurial trial
lawyers with a badge. There may still be a plausible "accountability" or "democracy"
argument in favor of Morrison's proposal, but it would have to be a great deal more
nuanced.
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preemption, he writes, compromises state regulatory authority.
State attorneys general, in supposed contrast, cannot do so; they
can only inflict economic losses. This account grossly understates
the extraterritoriality problem and wholly ignores institutional
features that render state attorneys general more rather than less
problematic.
State officials have no encompassing interest in the
collective welfare of the nation as a whole. They are supposed to
look exclusively to their own constituents' welfare, to the
exclusion of anyone else's. They will therefore underestimate or
ignore the external costs of their regulations, so long as the
regulations confer some in-state benefit. More problematically
still, they may attempt to impose costs on out-of-state entities
and to transfer the proceeds. The strategy is welfare-maximizinPs
for all officeholders, provided the aggression goes undetected. 5
It is rational, moreover, for each state's voters to elect
candidates who promise to maximize the in-state gains
regardless of external costs. Under a legal regime that poses no
meaningful impediment to state cost exports, each state's
citizens will pay the price of other states' exploitative strategies
in any event. The only plausible response is to return the favor.
While the institutional calculus just sketched applies to all
state regulators, it applies with special force to state attorneys
general. Unlike securities or utility regulators, state attorneys
general have no responsibility for the effective functioning of
any industry (perhaps excepting the litigation industry). Their
ordinary mode of "regulation" is not rulemaking pursuant to a
statute that embodies some rough legislative choices; it is
investigation and prosecution, often under open-ended, general
purpose civil or criminal fraud statutes. This feature routinely
produces a regulatory "process" in which all the heuristics are
wrong.36 The attorney general's demands for conduct remedies
will be informed by a generalist's perception of the outlier case
under investigation, as opposed to an expert regulator's
understanding of the practices and organization of a
sophisticated industry. The remedies will be shaped, not in an
open notice-and-comment rulemaking process but rather by the
35. For some empirical evidence of this calculus and its operation in one regulatory
arena, see Michael S. Greve, Cartel Federalism?: Antitrust Enforcement by State Attorneys
General, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (2005).
36. Richard J. Zeckhauser & Frederick Schauer, The Trouble With Cases, in
LITIGATION VERSUS REGULATION (Daniel Kessler & Andrei Shleifer eds., forthcoming
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1446897.
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parties' settlement incentives and in closed-door negotiations.
There is no intelligible reason to trust this process, and ample
reason to worry about the potential for collusion and selfdea1.mg. 37
Morrison's offhand argument that this arrangement does
not violate any state's formal regulatory authority is
implausible,38 and, in any event, beside the point. The question is
whether we should embrace a preemption regime that is
virtually certain to produce aggregate losses all around.
Assuming, of course, that we care about them.
POLYPHONY AND PREEMPTION: PROSPECTS

Preemption Choice seeks to integrate the analysis of
preemption law with high-level federalism theory. For better or
worse, though, the link is tenuous. The high-level theory is too
implausible and, frankly, too unserious to gain much traction; in
addition, its launch in Preemption Choice may suffer from bad
timing. In contrast, polyphonic preemption law will likely gain
further ground, for reasons having nothing to do with polyphonic
theory.
Preemption Choice, as noted, is preoccupied with the
regulation of complex, technically challenging problems of
national and, indeed, global reach. In these venues, the case for
polyphonic
federalism
teems
with
complications
extraterritoriality, the need for expertise, public choice and
incentive problems, the loss of transparency and accountability
that invariably attends "cooperative" federal-state regimes, and
so on. Having recognized the difficulties aside, polyphonic
(adaptive, dynamic, empowerment) federalism can do no better
37. The most appalling example remains the 1998 "Master Settlement Agreement"
(MSA) among 46 states, the major tobacco manufacturers, and plaintiffs' lawyers.
Though nominally designated as a settlement of state lawsuits against the tobacco
manufacturers, the agreement had the purpose and effect of creating a tobacco cartel
that has produced hundreds of billions of dollars in monopoly profits. The MSA
guarantees states and plaintiffs' lawyers a share of those profits. For accounts of the
MSA's genesis, nature, and effects see, e.g., Ian Ayres, Using Tort Settlements To
Cartelize, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 595 (2000); MARTHA DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE 163-208
(2002); Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 Mo. L. REV.
285, 346 (2003).
38. It is implausible because the authority that remains unaffected by attorney
general interventions and their extraterritorial effects is the authority to prohibit. Sister
state authority to tolerate or promote certain forms of private conduct is compromised
all the time. If a product or service disappears nationwide because of a single state's law
(as with design defect lawsuits), that is the equivalent of what Buzbee calls "floor
preemption." See supra note 5.
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than to brush them aside. It would gain credibility as a general
theory if it started instead with easy, intuitively appealing cases
and, having drawn skeptical readers into its orbit, worked
through the complications. The most compelling case for
polyphony, it seems to me, is "moral" federalism-regulation of
the death penalty, abortion, gay marriage, and perhaps the
public display of religious symbols. Unlike the states'
experiments on out-of-state producers, their regulation of their
own citizens' mores presents no extraterritoriality concerns
worth worrying about. Morals politics is noisy and not always
pretty; but it is also entrepreneurial, democratic, and unaffected
by the rent-seeking orgies that are the stuff of regulatory policy.
In sharp contrast to the fiendishly difficult risk-risk trade-offs in
pharmaceutical markets or the daunting scientific complexities
of climate change policy, morals issues are low-tech, high-values.
On such questions, all the advantages go to a system that leaves
room for decentralized decision-making-all the more so
because those decisions are usually made at the ballot box or by
popular referendum, not by hand-picked jurors with hindsight
bias or by state officials with misaligned incentives. In short, in
the morals context, what's not to like about polyphony?
The fact that no polyphonist, in Preemption Choice or, to
the best of my knowledge, anywhere else, seems to have even
thought of arguing from the easy morals case to the hard
regulatory cases suggests, to this reader at least, a lack of
theoretical seriousness. For all its pretensions, polyphony is not
and does not really want to be a general federalism theory at all.
It is a theory by progressives, for progressive ends and in defense
of a preconceived preference for more regulation. William
Eskridge's dust cover blurb helpfully identifies the polemical
targets of Preemption Choice-the business-friendly, pro
preemption Bush Administration and the Roberts Court.39
While one of those targets has since become history, post
publication
events-the
election
of
a
progressive
Administration, and a near-unprecedented financial crisis-may
appear to have rendered the polyphonic agenda especially
timely. It is equally likely, however, that those events have
produced, or will in time produce, a mismatch between
progressive theory and progressive politics on preemption.

39. "A common theme is that the Bush Administration and the Supreme Court
have undermined both federalism and good regulatory policy by heeding business
demands for preemption of state common law across whole areas of law."
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Polyphonic federalism imperils not just private corporations in
interstate commerce. It threatens any kind of project, private or
public, that requires central coordination and a coherent
weighing of competing public objectives. Thus, for a progressive
Administration with very grand objectives, polphony may not be
a natural choice. For example, polyphonic federalism has a clear
preemption prescription for design defect lawsuits against
General Motors; an Administration that owns GM may have
different ideas.4° For another example, the Administration has
touted its intentions to promote "green" forms of energy, from
wind to solar. Those industries cannot be subsidized up to scale;
expanding them will, or would, require firm federal preemptions
of state law.41 Similarly, the financial crisis may strengthen the
polyphonic case only at first impression. Of course, the crisis has
been widely attributed to a woeful lack of oversight and
regulation by federal authorities, and the notion that polyphony
might have prevented unconscionable risk-taking on Wall Street,
depredations in the subprime mortgage market, and reckless
profiteering in the financial industries may fall on receptive
ears.42 However, the federal government needs private financial
institutions for any number of purposes-for example, to
restructure existing mortgages, to provide credit to an ailing
small business sector, and to buy and unload alarming piles of
United States debt instruments. Polyphonic federalism could
easily frustrate any of these objectives. It is well-suited to
appropriating the profits of private financial institutions. It is
wholly unsuited to the emerging system of govemment
sponsored finance capitalism.
For all that, polyphony's preemption prescriptions may well
gain ground. At the legislative level, Buzbee rightly notes (p. 2),
non-preemption is the ordinary choice in any event. Polyphonic
federalism theory's chief function is to supply more or less
40.

For an overview of the controversy,

Jody Xu, GM's Bankruptcy: What
WALL ST. J., June 2, 2009,
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/06/02/gms-bankruptcy-what-happens-to-people-who-had
lawsuits-against-gm/tab/article/.
41. For example, see Renewable Electricity: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Energy
and Natural Resources, llOth Cong. 9-15, 59-65, 84 (2008) (statements of T. Boone
Pickens & Donald N. Furman).
42. That is certainly the operative premise behind the recently enacted federal
reforms that substantially weaken federal agencies' exclusive jurisdiction over federally
chartered financial institutions and expose those enterprises to visitation, regulation, and
litigation by state officials and to private lawsuits under state law. See Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1041-1046, 124
Stat. 1376, 2011-18 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
see

Happens to People Who Had Lawsuits Against GM?,
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plausible post hoc rationalizations for results that are
preordained by political dynamics and dysfunctions. At the
judicial level, judicial preemption choices that are consistent with
polyphonic presumptions are not dependent on those
presumptions. As Bradford R. Clark's essay in Preemption
Choice suggests, anti-preemption positions have of late gained
favor among conservative, clause-bound originalists, including
those on the Supreme Court.43 That tendency is in no way
Gerived from, or even in sympathy with, polyphony and its
liberal-progressive intentions; it is driven by such standard
conservative tropes as deference to Congress, interpretive
textualism, and respect for state sovereignty. While Preemption
Choice views "common pro-preemption arguments" as dominant
and even ascendant (see e.g., pp. 3, 46-51), it appears that those
arguments have lost traction in many quarters and across a
broad spectrum of political and jurisprudential views.
Polyphonic federalism may thus prevail despite its lack of
theoretical appeal: it no longer has an enemy.

43. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1210 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009) (Scalia, J.).

